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Abstract
In the past decade, ASEAN has been the primary driver of East Asian regionalism,
and Korea has been an active supporter of ASEAN plus Three. Korea has explored the
idea of an East Asian Community, and has been relatively open to notions of Asia–
Pacific regionalism. The ROK has involved itself comparatively heavily in regional
projects as both an initiator and a participant, but its notion of ‘region’ has oscillated
between more and less inclusive forms of regionalism. This article examines how
competing conceptions of region have influenced Korea’s pursuit of regional initiatives.
By revisiting historical understandings of Korea’s regional identity, we explore the
normative bases and material interests which motivate Korean regional initiatives, and
assess the impact of its proposals.
Introduction
The Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) has emerged as an active proponent
of regionalism in the past decade. Its inclusion in ASEAN-centric forums, especially
ASEAN plus Three (APT), underlines its status as a core East Asian state. For instance
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which was launched as the effects of the Asian
Financial Crisis were still keenly felt in the ROK, signalled a new phase of regional
integration and cooperation (Choo, 2009). Such initiatives are notable insofar as
Southeast Asian states have adopted the leading role. South Korea has participated in
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community-building projects such as the East Asian Summit, and ‘has its own
conception of the emerging region formation’ (Selden, 2010). The ROK identifies
as a core Asian state, but its security and economic interests extend to the broader
Pacific region. Its longstanding security alliance with the US entails some extra-regional
contributions to US-led campaigns such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the
ROK has global trade and financial relations which demand an active presence in
international economic forums such as the G20 grouping. Given its identity, policy
stance, and interests, two sets of issues arise in analysing Korea’s approaches to
regionalism.
The first concerns the debates which have shaped the formation of South Korean
initiatives, and the notion of ‘region’ that most strongly prevails in policymaking circles.
Which broad governing norms and material interests inform ‘big’ Korean visions for
the region, and on which intellectual basis has the ROK formulated ‘small’ visions, in
the form of specific proposals, initiatives, and mechanisms for regional integration? Is
the ROK more responsive to relatively exclusive notions of ‘Asianism’, or does Korea
define its interests and identity more with the wider, looser definition of region inherent
in ‘Pacificism’ (He, 2004; Wesley, 2009)? Furthermore, to what degree have the ideas
and proposals of Korean policymakers reflected popular notions of ‘region’, and the
proposals formulated by civil society? Intuitively, there will be at least some congruence
between the notions of region which epistemic communities of policymakers share,
and the notions which prevail among the broader populace.
A second set of issues surrounds the degree to which South Korea has succeeded in
‘selling’ its visions to other states. Have Korean proposals been accepted or rejected? A
key point of conjecture in regional visions relates to the notion of ‘community’ and the
degree to which it is institutionalized. Again, two contrasting visions present themselves:
a formal pooling of national sovereignty, as has evolved in the European Union, or a
weaker and more informal version of regional solidarity proposed by ASEAN, which
‘remains wedded to state sovereignty as an initial preference [and] which results in a
high degree of autonomy for national governments in determining domestic policy’
(Khong and Nesadurai, 2008: 33). Furthermore, which state/s does the ROK envisage
leading the development of a regional community?
Thinking about regionalism
Regions are a heavily contested concept. According to Hettne, ‘definitions of a
“region” vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation’
(2005: 544). Rather than seemingly objective criteria such as geography and culture,
‘it is how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and notions
of “regionness” that is critical’ (Hettne, 2005: 544). Some states exclude others from
a regional organization: ‘A region or an area covered by a regional framework is
not determined a priori. It is a social construct . . . Because a region is not a given,
membership of a regional framework becomes a problem’ (Hamanaka, 2009: 24).
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A region may be simultaneously defined both by the states that fall within it and
also by states external to it. According to Said (1978), the ‘Orient’ (‘East’) is basically a
Western construction. For instance, it was Western politicians and scholars who coined
the term ‘the East’, and who referred to the lands which adjoin Europe as the Near East,
the Middle East, and the Far East. It was also the West that coined the term ‘Asia’, and
divided it into South Asia, West Asia, and East Asia (and subsequently into Northeast
and Southeast Asia).
One consequence of the creation of a collective Asian identity is the misplaced
assumption of cultural similarity among Asian states. Korea – both prior to the division
of the peninsula in 1945 and thereafter – has struggled to define its regional identity.
Relations between the ROK and neighboring states such as Japan and China have
been particularly fraught, making problematic any assumptions of cultural similarity
or alignment of interests and perspective. Whenever international and regional orders
have been in flux over the millennia, Korea has undergone similar struggles with its
identity (Shin, 2005: 618). Korean conceptions of ‘region’ fall into three main categories,
the Asia–Pacific, East Asia, and Northeast Asia, each of which projects a specific vision.
The coexistence of these three categories has made problematic a coherent vision of
region among Korean policymakers and scholars (K. Kim, 2010).
The first, and broadest, notion of region is that of the Asia–Pacific. In the early
phases of the Cold War, the Republic of Korea was physically and ideologically isolated
from its neighbors. Since a geographical definition of region – a group of contiguous
states – was problematic, Korean leaders emphasized ideological commonality (anti-
communism) in envisioning a region. The ‘Asia–Pacific’ thus connotes a sphere of
cooperation between advanced Western states in the Pacific on the one hand and Asian
states on the other (Lee et al., 2009: 82; Ryohei, 2007: 228). Conservative governments
in particular have not viewed Pacific regionalism as being in any way incompatible
with the maintenance of close security relations with the United States. This pan-
Pacific notion of regionalism was intended to supplement, not supplant bilateralism, as
has been exemplified by the campaign of the Lee Myung-bak government (2008–) to
‘expand and revitalize the pan-Pacific cooperation under the leadership of the United
States’ (S. Kim, 2009: 3).
This inclusive notion of region (‘Pacificism’) may be contrasted to ‘Asianism’,
which is narrower and more exclusionary (J. Kim, 2010; Wesley, 2009: 56–9). Asianism,
or pan-Asianism (He, 2004: 107–11), ‘promote[s] solidarity and cooperation within
“Asia”, usually against the political, economic and cultural influence of “the West”’
(Ryohei, 2007: 226). Therefore, this restrictive notion of regional identity preceded
its broader counterpart in that the former highlighted the distinctive identity shared
by Asians to cope with the influx of Western ideas and institutions. ‘Asians only’
regionalism surfaced in South Korean politics in the 1990s, but its origin can be traced
to the turn of the nineteenth century when Westerners began to make headways into
Korea and Asia more broadly. The term Asia or East Asia, nonetheless, had negative
connotations because of its links to Japan’s Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, but
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an Asian regional consciousness has strengthened since the 1990s for three reasons: the
shared experience of rapid economic development; the notion, propounded mainly by
progressive intellectuals, that East Asian solidarity can resolve problems such as the
division of the Korean Peninsula; and the need for a ‘community’ which can promote
regional cooperation amid a rapidly changing international order (Lee et al., 2009: 134–
42). Proponents of an Asianist variant of regionalism, including former prime minister
Cho Soon (2003), are more likely to predict that China can integrate peacefully into the
region and in ways that are conducive to Korean interests. Consequently, progressive
Korean governments have de-emphasized the imperative to collaborate closely with the
US and other Pacific states.
The third form of regionalism to which Korea has been a party as either an initiator
or a supporter is at the sub-regional level. The ROK has cooperated with its Northeast
Asian neighbors, especially Japan and China, to promote coordination on issues of
common concern. What began with the Northern Diplomacy under Roh Tae-woo
(Choo, 2009: 95–6) has gradually evolved into a form of trilateralism (Kim and Park,
2005), and this narrower vision of regionalism was evident during the Roh Moo-hyun
government. In addition to proposing that the ROK act as a ‘balancer’ in Northeast
Asia and a economic ‘hub’ for the sub-region, cooperation via the APT mechanism
accelerated under Roh. The Northeast Asia sub-region has also played host to a range
of initiatives by non-state actors. For instance, history researchers from China, Korea,
and Japan have collaborated on bilateral and trilateral bases to arrive at common
understandings of regional history (He and Hundt, 2011), while transnational links
between civil society actors in sectors such as the environment are also substantial.
In exploring how Koreans have defined their region and their place in it, we
seek to ascertain how the Asianist and Pacificist logics have influenced Korean
regional initiatives. The article argues that Korean notions of regional identity have
oscillated between these two poles, depending on which sets of ideas have enjoyed
the greatest degree of salience at a particular point in time. We illustrate these
oscillations by analysing the evolution of Korean initiatives in economic, security,
and diplomatic regionalism, including projects of community building. The article
proceeds chronologically, and analyses initiatives that Korea has proposed, and also
Korean perspectives on major initiatives proposed by other states, since the onset of the
Cold War. We conclude by assessing the degree to which Korea’s preferred vision of
the region has been realized, as well as factors which determine the success or failure of
specific proposals.
From Pacific regionalism to East Asian regionalism
After the founding of the Republic of Korea in the early phases of the Cold War,
leaders of the new state wrestled with the issue of national identity. In particular, they
sought to maintain close ties with the US, which pressed for a prompt rapprochement
between the ROK and its erstwhile coloniser and neighbour, Japan. Reliance on the
US consequently shaped Korean proposals for regional cooperation. Syngman Rhee
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for instance called for the formation of a Pacific Union, a NATO-style alliance of anti-
communist states in Asia and the Pacific. Rhee consulted anti-communist governments
(other than Japan), and some indicated an interest in the formation of such an alliance.
The matter was discussed sporadically until 1954, but Rhee lost interest in the initiative
due to his preoccupation with domestic politics (Lee et al., 2009: 123).
In the mid-1960s, a second Korean regional security initiative emerged. Park
Chung Hee proposed the formation of the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC), consisting
of the ‘free nations’ of the region such as Park’s close ally, the Republic of China
(Taiwan). The announcement was heavily imbued with anti-communist rhetoric.
Park had gained confidence from the deployment of Korean troops to Vietnam, and
sought to play a ‘leading role’ in the Asia–Pacific as a security partner of the US.
Meetings were held between 1966 and 1972, but the absence of a clear focus and
purpose, coupled with differences in opinion about whether anti-communist states
could achieve a rapprochement with Communist China, resulted in the organization
ceasing to function (Hamanaka, 2009: 46–50; Lee et al., 2009: 81–2, 124–5).
The next Korean venture in regional summitry was Chun Doo-hwan’s call for a
Pacific Summit, which he envisioned as a regular series of meetings between the region’s
powers. The summit would be open to all prospective members, promote respect for
the sovereignty and independence of member states, promote regional trade, and
facilitate cooperation between advanced and developing states. Chun’s proposal for ‘an
institutional mechanism to reach agreement about areas of cooperation’ was considered
too vague, however, and the ROK’s low diplomatic profile hindered efforts to sell the
merits of the proposal to other states (Lee et al., 2009: 126–8).
By the late 1980s, the Cold War divisions began to melt in East Asia. Both Pacificist
and Asianist visions of regional order emerged, but competing visions came into
conflict. Rather than security issues, regionalism tended to focus on economics. Japan
favoured a form of trade liberalization, which would engage the United States in regional
affairs. In collaboration with Australia, Japan proposed the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). Australia’s Bob Hawke proposed APEC during a visit to Seoul in
January 1989, and Roh Tae-woo warmly received the initiative and offered his support
(Hamanaka, 2009: 143–5). The ROK became a founding member of the organization,
and hosted the third summit in 1991. The summit was a diplomatic coup for Roh, in
that the Seoul Declaration specified that APEC members were economic rather than
political entities. By declaring itself a group populated by economies rather than states,
Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were all able to attend APEC meetings (Lee
et al., 2009: 128–9). In the months leading up to the inaugural APEC leaders’ summit
in Seattle in late 1993, Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo stated that APEC could
‘contribute decisively to the promotion and productive management of the trans-Pacific
interdependence’ (Han, 1993), signalling the ROK’s strong support for APEC.
APEC faced an Asianist rival in the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), which
Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohammad envisioned as an Asian economic bloc to rival those
in Europe and North America. Mahathir viewed APEC as a non-Asian construct,
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and directly attacked its legitimacy by not attending the Seattle summit. According to
Anthony Milner, ‘The “East Asian” vision which [Mahathir] advocated – a narrower
regionalism that would be driven by Asian states – had many supporters’ (Milner
et al., 2010: 2), but its explicit exclusion of the US aroused unease. Under pressure
to open their markets to US goods and services, both the ROK and Japan indicated
interest in the EAEC. The US strongly opposed the formation of an exclusionary trade
bloc, however, and Secretary of State James Baker suggested to his Korean and Japanese
counterparts that they not support the initiative (Mahathir, 2006). This pressure limited
the willingness of the ROK to openly support exclusionary forms of regionalism, but the
foreign ministers of the proposed EAEC membership – ASEAN, China, Japan, and
the ROK – met for informal lunches during the ASEAN summits of 1994 and 1995
(Hamanaka, 2009: 147–53). The result of these informal meetings was an agreement ‘to
hold the [Asia–Europe Meeting, ASEM] without extending invitations to Australia and
New Zealand’, and the United States. Malaysia rejected a request from Japan to invite
Australia and New Zealand, on the grounds that these states ‘[did] not share our Asian
values’ (cited in Komori, 2009: 167). In this sense, the ROK was identifying as an East
Asian state rather than – or in addition to – an Asia–Pacific state. At least implicitly,
Korea was lending legitimacy to an Asianist regional project.
Korean initiatives were also launched at the sub-regional level. Roh Tae-woo
adopted an activist foreign policy stance, which was encapsulated in his Northern
Diplomacy. In addition to establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and
China, Roh’s Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative envisioned these communist giants
joining the two Koreas, the US, and Japan in a sub-regional cooperative mechanism
(Lee et al., 2009: 129–31). Such a mechanism informed the Geneva Accords, a set
of agreements that envisioned North Korea surrendering its nuclear weapons and
programs in return for the construction of new nuclear reactors, economic aid, and
diplomatic recognition. The Kim Young-sam government reluctantly acquiesced to the
Accords out of deference to the US, but resented being reduced to a secondary role and
lacking direct interaction with the North.
East Asian vision
Kim Dae-jung was elected president as the ROK and other states experienced ‘a
threat to [their] economic survival’ (Khong and Nesadurai, 2008: 58). As the Asian
financial crisis spread beyond Southeast Asia to engulf other states, Japan proposed a
new body – the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) – to coordinate regional efforts to prevent
financial instability and to assist in economic recovery. Several East Asian states had
adopted Japan’s model of state-led economic development, and the AMF proposal was
in part intended to protect the legacy of this model (Kim, 2007: 67–8). At a meeting in
1997 to discuss the AMF, the strongest support came from the ASEAN states and South
Korea, whose economies were the most affected by the financial crisis. The US and the
IMF opposed the formation of the new body, for fear that it would usurp the IMF’s
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role in crisis management (Hamanaka, 2009: 112–14). China also opposed the AMF, on
the grounds that it would enhance Japan’s influence in the region.
The AMF failed to materialize, but the financial crisis provided an impetus to
regional cooperation (Thomas, 2009: 2). To prevent a repetition of the crisis, East
Asian states launched the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), ‘a regional liquidity facility
aimed at providing short-term financing to support currencies in crises’ (Khong and
Nesadurai, 2008: 33). Japan and Korea signed a ‘swap’ agreement in January 1999
valued at $5 billion, and Japan concluded four more agreements with other East Asian
states (Hamanaka, 2009: 118). In 2009, the CMI transformed from a series of bilateral
agreements to a regional pool totalling $120 billion. China and Japan each provided
32% of the funds, ASEAN members collectively supplied 20%, and South Korea was
responsible for 16% (Y. Kim, 2009). The CMI is a project which the Southeast Asian
states could not undertake alone: it requires the substantial financial capacities of China
and Japan (Khong and Nesadurai, 2008: 33), and to a lesser extent Korea. The APT states
now have, in the CMI, ‘pooled resources, national commitments, policy agendas’, and
‘a record of concrete results including measures to protect members against future
financial crises’ (Emmerson, 2010: 3–4).
Despite the salience of bilateralism in Korean foreign policy, the ROK has
contributed to the growth in East Asian consciousness in the past decade. In 1999,
APT states accepted a proposal by Kim Dae-jung for an East Asia Vision Group (EAVG)
(Kim, 2006). A group of intellectuals ‘was commissioned to provide a blueprint for the
development of East Asian regional cooperation’. Again at Kim’s suggestion, a group
of government officials, known as the East Asia Study Group (EASG), was assembled
to consider the EAVG’s recommendations (Kim, 2007: 71–2; Komori, 2009: 170). The
EAVG and EASG laid the foundation for annual summit meetings among the ASEAN
plus Three states. The EAVG and EASG reports also became the basis of the inaugural
East Asian Summit in December 2005. Kim Dae-jung’s vision of regionalism in part
resembles that proposed by former Japanese prime minister Hatoyama Yukio in 2009,
in that both leaders attempted to create a strategic space for Asian states to move away
from total dependence on their alliances with the US. Kim’s call for Asian regionalism
garnered significant support from Asians.
Kim also focused on sub-regional issues, especially inter-Korean relations. The
Sunshine Policy, which emphasized engagement with the North, was intended to deliver
gradual and incremental reconciliation with North Korea. According to Bruce Cumings,
Kim did ‘more to change policy toward the North than any previous South Korea or
US president’ (2007: 28) by focusing on reconciliation as a preparatory step to national
unification. The most tangible result of the policy was the inter-Korea summit in
Pyongyang during June 2000. The engagement policy benefited from the support of
the Clinton administration, but George W. Bush was far less supportive of policies that
were deemed to be beneficial to the Kim Jong Il regime. The administration’s stance
on Pyongyang hardened following 11 September 2001, with the regime forming part of
Bush’s ‘axis of evil’.
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From East Asia to Northeast Asia
Under the progressive Kim and Roh governments, the imperative to maintain
close ties with the US hampered the Sunshine Policy. Engagement became problematic
without the support of the ROK’s main security partner. An opportunity emerged,
however, to negotiate a solution to the nuclear crisis when the Bush administration’s
focus turned to Iraq in late 2002. The problem of North Korea’s suspected weapons
capacity fell primarily to South Korea and China, both of which argued that there was
no justification for the North to acquire nuclear weapons. China convened the Six Party
Talks (SPT) in order to avoid conflict and renew Pyongyang’s commitment to quit its
nuclear programs (Selden, 2010). The SPT was ostensibly a mechanism for responding
to the nuclear crisis, but the US recognized the value of a venue for sub-regional
dialogue (Hill, 2010) Secretary of State, Colin Powell, for instance emphasized that the
US and its allies ‘speak with a common voice’ (cited in Gilson, 2007: 154) on the North’s
nuclear program. Pyongyang detonated a nuclear device in October 2006, however,
and North Korea became the first state to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty (NPT) after the test (Armstrong, 2007: 264). It subsequently dealt a blow to
advocates of engagement such as Roh Moo-hyun, who was more willing to question US
foreign policy than any of his predecessors. Roh went so far as to propose that South
Korea act as a ‘balancer’ between the US and North Korea in Northeast Asia in order
to facilitate peace and development, but the notion was shelved after being criticized
for jeopardizing the US alliance, under-estimating the power resources which such a
proposal would entail, and ignoring the realities of great power politics (Bae, 2008:
97–8; Jeong and Lee, 2010: 40). Like Kim, Roh visited Pyongyang during his presidency
for a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il.
Roh’s sub-regional focus on security affairs was mirrored in the economic sphere.
Korean scholars and political leaders have expressed interest in intensifying sub-regional
economic integration, and one conception of integration has focused on the Yellow Sea
basin, encompassing northern China, the Korean peninsula, and Japan. Within such a
community, Korea would be the geographical centre and a core transportation hub. The
Roh government listed ‘transform[ing] Korea into the business hub of Northeast Asia’
as a ‘core economic policy strategy’ (Kang, 2003; see also Paik, 2004). Roh premised
the ROK’s emergence as a logistical and distribution hub on an improvement in inter-
Korean relations, and on the completion of ambitious projects such as gas pipelines
and railways linking South Korea with northern China and Russia. The failure to
elicit lasting change in the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), however,
inhibited progress on the hub proposal. Furthermore, inept publicity hindered the
proposal, which was it interpreted as a campaign to make Korea the geopolitical centre
of Northeast Asia.
During Roh’s term in office, ASEAN continued to project itself as the centrepiece
of regional cooperation and dialogue. For the ROK, regional forums became a new
means of addressing the North Korean issue. Most of ASEAN’s dialogue partners have
acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which commits states to respect
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others’ territorial sovereignty and political autonomy, to desist from interference in the
domestic affairs of others, and to renounce the use of force in settling disputes. Signing
the TAC also qualifies ASEAN’s dialogue partners for attendance of the East Asian
Summit (EAS), held annually since 2005. China and India signed the TAC in 2003, and
were followed by Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Pakistan (2004), and Australia
and New Zealand in 2005 (Khong and Nesadurai, 2008: 37, 75–6). The ROK, Japan,
and Australia stipulated that signing the treaty should not compromise their security
alliances with the US (Ravenhill, 2009: 225). North Korea acceded to the treaty in 2008
(Pak, 2008), after joining the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) in 2000. The Forum is the
only security body of which the North is a member, and given the stalemate in the
SPT, it is one of the few venues in which the DPRK can be ‘socialized’ (Choi, 2009).
For instance at the 2003 forum in Phnom Penh, a statement was issued which urged
Pyongyang to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections
and not act on a threat to quit the NPT (Khong and Nesadurai, 2008: 71–2). When
the ROK tried to have the issue of North Korean provocations added to the agenda of
the 2008 forum, however, ASEAN refused to countenance discussion of such a divisive
issue. Confronting the North so openly was not considered to be in keeping with the
‘ASEAN way’ (Y. Kim, 2009).
A return to Pacificism?
Lee Myung-bak reversed the engagement policy of his predecessors, and argued
that Pyongyang needed to offer gratitude and a willingness to achieve reconciliation
(Haggard and Noland, 2009: 99). Lee proposed a ‘grand bargain’, entailing the
restructuring of North Korea’s economy in return for the cessation of all nuclear-
related programs (Tsai, 2009). In response, the North ratcheted up tensions. The Mount
Kumgang tourist resort was closed in 2008 after a decade of operation, curtailing a
lucrative source of income for the North. In early 2009, the North expelled all non-
essential South Korean personnel from the Kaesong Industrial Zone (Foster–Carter,
2010: 92, 95). A few months later, Pyongyang declared ‘all-out confrontation’ and
abrogated its agreements with the ROK (ICG, 2009), including its recognition of the
Northern Limit Line, the sea boundary to the west of the peninsula (Snyder, 2009:
12). After the Cheonan incident of March 2010, the Lee government suspended most
inter-Korean trade and investment links, except for Kaesong (Foster–Carter, 2010: 89,
104). Moreover, Lee has prioritized the US alliance, and has not questioned US foreign
policy objectives to anywhere near the same degree as Kim or Roh.
Lee’s regionalist strategy has also diverged from those of his predecessors, especially
in his emphasis on improving ties with states outside of Northeast Asia. Lee’s ‘New Asian
diplomacy’ has focused on ties with ASEAN, Central and South Asia, and Australia and
New Zealand (Choo, 2009: 42–5). ASEAN has become a special target for influence by
the Northeast Asian ‘plus three’ states, which have expanded their levels of development
assistance, proposed intensified economic cooperation, and strengthened cooperation
about global issues (Choi, 2009). For instance, China gave $14.8 billion in aid to ASEAN
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from 2002 to 2007, and Japan provided $20 billion in official aid and $5 billion in ‘green
projects’ during the same period. Korean aid disbursements were comparatively low
despite Southeast Asian being collectively the ROK’s third-biggest trading partner and
second-largest destination of Korean investment. As part of the New Asia Initiative, Lee
promised that aid to ASEAN would increase to $400 million per year until 2015 (Ahn,
2009). A high point of Korea’s relations with ASEAN came in the ‘special summit’ of
May 2009. The summit commemorated the 20th anniversary of the ROK’s formal ties
to ASEAN, and Lee hosted bilateral summits with the leaders of all ASEAN states. This
was a rare occurrence of ASEAN holding a formal gathering outside Southeast Asia;
the only other occasions when ASEAN has played the role of guest rather than host
was when similar summits were held with China and Japan. The ROK thus attained
a nominal status that was broadly commensurate with its two large Northeast Asian
neighbours (Choi, 2009). Bilateral relations were upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership’
in 2010 (Yoon, 2010).
Lee has worked closely with Australia, another self-described middle power, on
projects such as the G20. Under Lee, Korea has indicated an interest in the notion of
bolstering regional dialogues along the lines of an ‘ASEAN+5’ that includes Australia and
New Zealand (Park and Lee, 2003: 285). The ROK offered support for the ‘Asia–Pacific
community’ (APc) proposal, whereby Australia’s Kevin Rudd called for a ‘regional
institution that spans the entire Asia–Pacific region’. The proposal for a new institution
implied that extant bodies in the region, such as APEC, had failed to engage in ‘the full
spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic, political and security issues’
(Rudd cited in Milner et al., 2010: 2; see also He, 2011). During Lee’s visit to Australia
in 2009, the two states promised to ‘consult closely’ (DFAT, 2009) on the initiative, and
former South Korean prime minister Han Seong-soo suggested an eminent persons’
group be formed to devise a ‘concrete action plan for the eventual creation of an Asia
Pacific community’ (2009: 17). Against a backdrop of competing regional initiatives,
including the possibility of the US and Russia joining the East Asian Summit, the APc
failed to attract enough support to become institutionalized.
A spate of free trade agreements (FTAs) – a ‘new bilateralism’ (Ravenhill, 2003) –
emerged across the Asia–Pacific following the AFC. The failure of the World Trade
Organization’s Doha Round to produce a multilateral agreement to liberalize trade,
coupled with the inability of APEC to formulate a regional trade pact, created a
newfound interest in bilateral FTAs. By the late 1990s, Japan and the ROK were the only
WTO members that were not party to an agreement. The ROK announced that the
pursuit of FTAs would form part of its national economic strategy (Hamanaka, 2009:
154–5) as it sought to overcome the financial crisis. Korea became an active negotiator of
FTAs: currently 16 FTAs are in effect and another 12 are being negotiated (Yonhap, 2010).
An agreement that will come into effect in 2011 with the European Union represents
an opportunity to secure access to what is collectively Korea’s second-biggest market
(Miller and Dalton, 2010). The South Korea–US (KORUS) FTA was signed in 2007, but
faced lengthy delays due to disputes over access to the Korean market for US beef and
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automobiles. When visiting Washington in April 2010, President Lee emphasized the
strategic importance of the agreement: ‘The United States should always keep in mind
China, which is growing fast, militarily and economically. The ratification of the KORUS
FTA has a much more important meaning than simple economic cooperation between
two allies’ (cited in Stangarone, 2010, emphasis added). In doing so, Lee reminded
the US that part of the appeal of the FTA lies in its enmeshment of the interests of
the alliance partners. The agreement was finalized in late 2010, soon after President
Obama’s visit to Seoul (New York Times, 2010).
Lee has pursued closer ties with states across the broader Asia–Pacific, and also
has been party to an enhanced form of sub-regional cooperation. Concurrent with
their coordination on the CMI, China, Korea and Japan have also engaged in a range
of trilateral ventures. Regular annual summits have been initiated to discuss areas for
cooperation. For instance a summit in late 2008 strived ‘to frame a common policy in
response to the world recession’ (Selden, 2010), suggesting that the trilateral mechanism
has the potential to facilitate cooperation at both the regional and global levels.
Assessing Korean ideas
Institutionalization is a conventional measure of ideas about regionalism. Since
regionalism is not given exogenously but constructed socially by interaction between
states, a criterion of success can be the extent to which those proposals win the ‘hearts
and minds’ of other regional stakeholders. In order for the initiatives to be appealing,
the proposals should appeal to other states.
On the one hand, Korean proposals for broad regional integration (Pacific Union,
ASPAC, Pacific Summit) were not institutionalized, although ASPAC did meet for seven
years from the 1960s. Roh Moo-hyun’s Northeast Asian balancer and hub proposals,
which were proposed roles for the ROK rather than initiatives for institutionalized
collective action, were not well received, and were subsequently not pursued. On
the other hand, the region readily accepted Kim Dae-jung’s proposal to establish the
East Asian Vision/Study Groups, whose membership was ad hoc, whose timeframe
was implicitly limited, and whose remit was narrowly circumscribed. These were not
proposals for institutions in the conventional sense, so we may conclude that no Korean
initiative for formal institution-building has succeeded.
There is much scepticism about East Asian regionalism, with one scholar describing
it as ‘much ado about nothing’ (Ravenhill, 2009). A Korean scholar argues that the region
is becoming more economically integrated, while remaining underdeveloped in terms
of formal institutions, the result of which is ‘regionalization without regionalism’
(Shin, 2005: 627). If even longstanding initiatives have failed to be meaningfully
institutionalized, it should come as no surprise that Korean proposals have not
been well entrenched. We conclude with six findings about Korean notions of
regionalism.
First, there are inherent limits to the capacity of the ROK to shape the contours
of regionalism. The ROK is increasingly treated as a middle power in recent literature
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as well as in policymaking circles. Middle powers, by definition, do not wield the same
degree of influence as their great-power counterparts, and any expectations that Korea
will devise a ‘grand design’ for the region are unrealistic. As a middle power, it is
difficult for South Korea to lead regional initiatives, and therefore it is more likely that
the ROK will be led. It is also unclear that the ROK has deeply considered the views
of others when formulating regional initiatives (Choi, 2008: 182). That said, power
has an inter-subjective dimension. From a social-constructivist perspective, regional
power is what (other) states make of it; how other states accept Korean proposals –
and input to ongoing processes – is perhaps more important than the absolute level
of the ROK’s material resources. Examples of Korean ideas being translated into
action include the EAVG/SG, which provided a blueprint for the region’s future and
proposals for cooperation, and also inventive diplomacy in the form of the Seoul and
Bogor Declarations in APEC, which helped sustain momentum for that organization.
Moreover, the ROK has the capacity to endow legitimacy on Asianist and Pacificist
regional projects. As Mahathir’s boycott of the 1993 APEC summit illustrated, even
small powers have the capacity to detract from an institution’s legitimacy by opting not
to participate, but – as yet – the ROK has not chosen to do so.
Second, the political persuasion of a government matters. Conservatives have
tended to favour broader regionalization and have been relatively reluctant to launch
major initiatives, whereas progressives have preferred narrow regionalist projects and
have been more active in launching initiatives. Leaders from both sides of politics have
favored a multilateral security framework for the region. Progressives, however, tend
to view multilateralism as an alternative to the bilateral security alliance with the US,
whereas conservatives tend to treat multilateralism as a supplement to the alliance. For
instance a conservative Korean scholar (S. Kim, 2009) claims that US confidence in
the regional alliance structure is a sine qua non for multilateral security cooperation
in the region. A progressive scholar considers regional multilateral security framework
as the ROK’s ‘exit’ strategy if the US fails to respond to the ROK’s ‘voice’. In this view,
the formation of a multilateral framework would allow the ROK to avoid ‘entrapment’
with the US (Lee, 2009: 2–6).
Third, it is imperative for the ROK to maintain strong relations with the US.
The progressive Kim and Roh governments questioned some aspects of US foreign
policy, but they subsequently reconfirmed the centrality of the alliance to Korean
national security. The unique security circumstances of the ROK, especially in the
form of its alliance commitments, thus act as a structural impediment to some Korean
initiatives, such as the Sunshine Policy. More broadly, the US presence and its series
of alliances have ‘made it much more difficult for Asian states to develop broad,
interlocking, institutionalized political arrangements of the kind that have characterized
the European experience’ (Katzenstein, 1997: 23). If the US becomes detached from East
Asia, however, as it did during the Bush period, and if the ROK begins to play a more
proactive role in the region, Korea could support a narrower vision of regionalism as a
substitute for the bilateral alliance (for the US perspective, see Boutin, 2011).
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Fourth, inter-Korean relations will continue to influence the ROK’s approach to
regionalism. The Kim Jong Il regime has demonstrated a capacity to cling to power
and stymie social and political transformation despite the concerted efforts of leaders
such as Kim Dae-jung to elicit change in the North (Buzo, 2007: 177). North Korean
provocations such as sinking the Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island will make the
ROK rely more heavily on its alliance with the US, thereby restricting the political space
South Korea needs to elaborate on a pan-Asian notion of regionalism. A host of issues
related to North Korea, such as its development of nuclear weapons and violation of
human rights, nonetheless has the potential to trigger a more serious discussion about
building a multilateral security framework in the region to deal with such issues. The
Six Party Talks can serve as a litmus test in this sense.
Fifth, due to the dearth of public opinion data regarding how South Korean public
has perceived Asian region and regionalism, it is difficult to gauge in what manner
public perception has translated into policy practices. Circumstantial evidence suggests,
however, that Korean public opinion and the tone of the press vacillated largely in time
with the cues and leads provided by the government. According to a poll conducted by
TNS Korea, 75% of Koreans favored Roh’s proposal for the ROK to become a Northeast
Asian regional balancer. And 68% of respondents replied that South Korea was capable
of playing the role of a balancer in the region, whereas 11% of the respondents replied
that the proposal was impractical (Kwon, 2005). A majority of the Korean public
cooled on Roh’s idea, however, as he started to lose political ground to the opposition
party.
Sixth, the oscillations between Korea’s Asianist and Pacificist visions illustrate
that the ROK has yet to settle on a definition of its own identity. This in turn has
limited the degree of solidarity and collective purpose that the ROK can share with
other East Asian states, and may explain why some of Korea’s broad regional initiatives
have not attracted a high level of support. A narrower articulation of Korea’s identity
and regionalist projects could increase the receptivity of fellow APT states to Korean
initiatives, but presumably this would require a significant renegotiation of Korea’s
alliance with the US.
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